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1. Religion vs politics – a process of secularization of the sacred
and sacralization of the profane.
Abasic purpose of this article is to analyze the relations between reli-gion and politics. A lot of similarities and analogies can be recognized
in this area, one can observe a process of a mutual interference of those
spheres. A basic thesis, enabling an acceptance of secular rituals is that
about a society secularization, understood as a transfer of religious content
to a secular sphere. The researcher can find a strict connection between
secularization and desacralization, which are the consequence of a deep
emancipation of modern society from religious institutions. This process
results: in the sphere of economy-in development of capitalism, in the
sphere of politics – in division between the state and the church, and in the
sphere of culture – in a process of laicization of educational system and the
autonomy of artistic and scientific activity1.
A great variety of definitions, applications of that term, a number of
secularization ideas can be found. In general, however, it is recognized as
a historic process, meaning a loss (inside a certain social order) of – a domi-
nation of religious institutions, religious activity, as well as religious way
of thinking which will be substituted by the competitive secular forms-as
science, politics, economy and administration2. It should be emphasized
that secularization does not mean desacralization, demitologization or
deritualization. In each sphere, even in a secular one, an element of reli-
gious logic exists. Despite of the fact to what extent desacralization pro-
1 E. Rothenbuhler, Komunikacja medialna: od rozmowy rodzinnej do ceremonii
medialnej, Kraków 2003, s. 51.
2 Ibidem, s. 146–151.
cess is advanced, the way of people’s thinking and behavior is unwittingly
immersed in the aura of religion3. As Cliford Geertz wrote: “In the politi-
cal center of every society we can find the ruling elite as well as the aggre-
gation of symbolic forms, which legitimize their rule. It does not matter if
they were chosen in the democratic or nondemocratic way, or how deep
divisions exist between them, they simply give reason of their power and
their activity in the categories of stories, ceremonies, insignias, accesso-
ries, which are succeeded or established”4.
Also a democratic system does not mean the automatic desacrali-
zation, just the opposite, the most interesting process is the quick revival
of political sacrum, denied by rationalistic critique5. Secularization gives
rise to new rituals and by no means deletes them: myths, symbols and ritu-
als (till now reserved for religion) are transferred to other domains, also to
a sphere of politics6.
Obviously, their form remains unchanged, they fulfill similar func-
tions, they meet analogue requirements; they simply touch different con-
tents – not religious but secular ones. The sacral elements still appear in
certain objects, formulas, forms, institutions. These modern sanctities are
laid on four basic levels including mythical and ritual aspects. Those are:
the level of the myth maintenance, the level of the wild sacrum and the
ideo-political level. In this moment we should add, that Raymond Aron
was the first person who was writing about a civic religion as a doctrine,
which was present (in the hearts of modern people), replacing the idea of
mankind salvation by the ideal social order in the future7.
Politics against the other domains is very susceptible for myths, cere-
monies and symbols to survive. It is connected with a majority of human
activities, conflicts inclusive. So we should not be surprised by the fact,
that politics tends to replace religion – the highest principle of social life
– to become a laic sacrum carrier. This is the exact meaning of seculariza-
tion process – the politics and the state are not already based on religion,
but the politics became (in some sense) the religion of the state. This re-
placement is not definite because the faith and the political hopes will be,
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Culture and its creators, ed. J. B. David, T. N. Clark, Chicago 1977, p. 152–153.
5 S. Filipowicz, Mit i spektakl w³adzy, Warszawa 1998, s. 166.
6 See: D. Kertzer, Ritual, politics and Power, New Haven 1998, p. 6.
7 J. Maisseneuve, Rytua³y dawne i wspó³czesne, Gdañsk 1995, s. 51–53.
sooner or later, denied by facts, despite of the symbolic support of laic lit-
urgies and secular rituals directly connected with the state.
Politically tinged ceremonies and rituals deserve a particular note ac-
cording to a kind of displacement of certain values from religious ceremo-
nies. This process causes a greater intensity of experiences and emotions
(at being continuously changed political meaning). A mythical element is
present even in the most pragmatic political activity. There are two very
important aspects of this problem: “a religious experience must be consid-
ered in a secularized society life – the second one – politics (particularly
a democratic one) should be practiced as a kind of unusual, uncommon,
ceremonial communication, adapted to the requirements of ceremony as
well as to the needs of efficient and proficient communication”8.
The division into two separate spheres (a political and religious one)
seems to be highly artificial. On the one hand we can indicate the analo-
gies in the mechanisms of religious and political spheres, on the other
hand there are many points where both spheres interfere (religious threads
appear in politics and political ones influence the Church or even the
Church is purposely involved in politics). So, on one hand, a seculariza-
tion of sacrum sphere9 follows, on the other hand, a profanum sphere is
sacralized. In this article we try to analyze these two levels. At a general
(form) level we accept the analogy between religion and politics (a trans-
fer of sacral elements into politics – the process of sacrum secularization),
but in micro scale, at the lower (content) level, a number of religious
threads appear and are used by politics to create political divisions, to fight
political opponent. In this meaning there exist a process of using authori-
ties, myths and religious symbols in a sphere of politics, and we can call it
a process of profanum sacralization.
Concerning this first statement, at a more general level, we can indi-
cate certain similarities between religion and politics. It can be observed at
several levels:
a) Although politics enters all domains of modern society activities it re-
mains something separated from everyday sphere. Marked by a ritual
domain, by myths it must, first of all influence a sphere of emotions
and symbols. It is also determined by certain fixed forms, places and
the time of public practice. Such interference of politics into an every-
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day sphere has got its unique institutionalized character. “A distance
between politics, politicians and everyday sphere is expected to be as-
sociated with a distance between God and the confessor”10 (an inac-
cessible, separated sphere – attainable only in holy time, by myths and
rituals);
b) in a political calendar, some enclaves of thinking and of activity in reli-
gious categories can be recognized; due to a converse of a dead time
and an activity time, a sacral and a secular one (elections and electoral
campaigns are holidays in a democratic calendar and religious holi-
days in a religious time) this political calendar assumes a nonlinearity
of the time11. A common faith is renewed in a religious life, religious
values and ideas are worshiped…In political life, certain ideals and
sanctities are honored, common beliefs are renewed, democratic myths
(of freedom, choice, sovereignty of people) are celebrated due to reali-
zed in regular intervals rituals;
c) faith is a very important element of both spheres: religion and politics.
In a sense, each authority (even a democratic one) acts in a similar way
as religion does, basing on a principle of an unreflective acceptance
and faith. Frankly speaking, the authority nowadays is (as a long time
ago) “good or bad (in a social reception), just later coming from God or
democratic elections”12.
Apolitical authority means a domination over symbols. These symbols
are the main means of attaining and maintaining a political force. The ele-
ments of symbolism, used in politics, are derived from a religious sphere
and there are, (first of all): myths, rituals and symbols13. Collective myths
and political rituals play the roles, reserved in primitive societies for
myths and religious or magic rituals. Mythical stories and ritual events al-
low participants to take part in a serious life (la vie serieuse in the meaning
of Emile Durkheim), no matter how we define it and whether it sends us to
the questions recognized (by participants) as political or religious ones14.
Each society, even a democratic one, has got its own mythology, which de-
fines its roots and origin, and the system of rituals which sanctifies the
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existed norms. In this way the anthropological theory, created for the use
of religious and ritual research, is also very helpful in the political studies.
2. The process of secularization and sacralization in Poland
We can be observed, a process of sacrum secularization and a process
of weakening a role of religion even in Poland, where a democratic order
is being built, new values and myths are strengthen. Tradition, arising in
a very difficult time of approaching democracy in Poland is, for certain de-
gree, a calculated, cultural phenomenon. It consists, not only of myths, rit-
uals and symbols, quasi-holy texts but also of institutions interfering a
political life. A system transformation required a political change and at-
taching a society to a new hierarchy of purposes and values. However, all
these regulations create a compact system based upon symbolic and
mythodological bases of democracy. A creation of a new democratic co-
herence requires some ideological “house-work” and a rejection of the
ideologies associated, in Poland, with national and religious traditions.
A success of consolidation of democracy in each country depends upon
the ability of coherence of the traditions of the past with a new “cultural
and political idiom”15. This way has just begun in Poland and has lasted
since 1989, a process of secularization and creating a new “political reli-
gion” has been proceeding.
On the other hand some religious threads are used in micro scale to cre-
ate the axes of political divisions. Apresent political discourse is in Poland
an unique game, related to a ritual, based both on parliamentary solutions
and an institutionalization of a conflict in a political life. This statement
applies to a parliamentary ritual (a division for government and opposi-
tion; a processes of coalitions creation; negotiations with members of co-
alitions; parliamentary voting) as well as to a ritual performing strictly
defined roles, imposed by axes of social, ideological and historical divi-
sions, deriving from their place on the traditional continuum of rightism
and leftism. Politicians, party-representatives perform these roles, as
a drama and a script of a democratic fight in Polish political discourse re-
quire. In that meaning, such questions as: an attitude towards European in-
tegration, attitude towards religion or communist past become a very
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efficient means to fight political opponents. On this ground a process of
profanum sacralization is being performed in Poland. Religious trains ap-
pear in a current political activity, moral authorities support party cam-
paigns and a religious symbolism is present in, a widely understood,
advertising and marketing activity16. In this moment it should be marked
that even in the economical sphere we can observe a lot of phenomenas
which are characteristic for the sacrum domain, in this meaning we can
analyze an existence of sacral elements (myths, holy-texts, institutions,
definitions, formulas) in the contemporary economical theory and prac-
tice.
As far as the chronological order is concerned, in the Polish society, the
tendencies to sacralise the profane became visible much earlier and had
deeper influences than the process of secularization of the profane. The
genesis of the former is connected with the period of non-existence of an
independent Polish state between 1795 and 1918. During that time in the
area of public discourse, the synthesis of national and religious content has
taken place. The Catholic confession has differed Polish people both
from the inhabitants of Russia (mostly Orthodox) and Prussia (mostly
Protestant). The political culture of a local gentry was dominated by
strong individualistic attitudes and a rather unsophisticated vision of free-
dom that were one of the major sources of a long-lasting crisis and the fu-
ture collapse of the Polish state. After Poland lost the national sovereignty,
no critical reflection about the reasons of this event has been made by the
society. Poland was described as an innocent victim, “the Christ of na-
tions”. Only a small group of historians, known as “the Cracov school”,
has payed attention to the anachronic character of Polish political culture
and the weakness of the public administration17. During that time, the pa-
pacy strongly condemned the Polish national uprising. The high clergy
tended to be rather opportunistic in their relations with the occupational
governments, while the parish priests did much to keep the Poles from as-
similating. During the last years of the 19th century, when the modern po-
litical orientations – the socialists and the national democrats – was being
formed, the attitudes toward religion and the church became one of the key
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factors of such division. For the national democrats, religion was in the
first place the background by which the Poles could be consolidated and
also the source of the attitudes promoted by this political camp, that is
sense of order and moral rigorism, whereas the socialists treated the
church as an institution interested in preventing any social reforms. This
division lasted until the beginning of the Second World War. Due to the
mentioned synthesis of the national and religious identity and also the
sceptical attitude of the clergy toward the capitalist economy, the Chris-
tian Democracy movement in the classical meaning of this term never
gained much support.
After 1945, when the communist left seized power in Poland, the posi-
tion of the Church became very similar to the one before 1918. The ecu-
menical hierarchy was consider to be representative of the vast majority of
Poles as far as the relations with an official government were concerned.
Between 1945 and 1976, the Catholic church was the only independent so-
cial actor that had influence in each social group. It has to be emphasized
that the dissenters from the communist party, who became the first opposi-
tion circle, were almost as opposed to the church as the party itself. The
radical change of the approach of so-called laic left was connected with
the perception of two books – Rodowody niepokornych (“The Genealogy
of the Unhumble”) by Bogdan Cywiñski and Koœció³, lewica, dialog
(English edition entitled “The Church and the Left”) by Adam Michnik. In
the former, the author emphasized the difference between two models of
the Catholic church relations with the state, both of which were mani-
fested in the ancient Rome. According to the author, the Constantinian
church is structurally connected with the state and legitimate its politics
while the Julianic one does not: “Despite its spiritual power never express
the full solidarity with the society […]. Not possessing any political influ-
ences, the church does not take the existence of any other centers of spiri-
tual or intellectual integration of the society into consideration […].
During the conflict with the secular government this institution would like
to act alone, without partners, with whom it does not feel any solidarity”18.
In the book written by Michnik19, a program of cooperation between the
political opposition and the church was formulated. The ground for such
an activity was protecting human and citizen rights. A few years later the
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first strictly right political groups were found. In their programs the men-
tioned synthesis of religious and national consciousness can be found. As
a consequence, it is justified to make a statement, that even though opposi-
tion groups were varied in their approach to religion, no one of these can
be called antireligious or even anticlerical. The program of the “Solidar-
ity” trade union, as far as economic issues are concerned, can be described
as socialist or even syndicalist. Much attention has been given to the mass
attachment to the Christian values, as well as to the Church itself20. Many
priests were involved in the opposition activity, although the higher clergy
have kept some distance from it. According to the research made by
K. Kosela more than half of the opposition election committees were lo-
cated in the areas that belong to the parishes21.
The first serious conflict between the hierarchy and the supporters of
the laic character of the state was connected with establishing religious ed-
ucation in public schools. Many people, even the ones who previously
sang in the chant: “We want God in book, and in school”, did not accepted
the fact that the decision was implemented as the Minister of Education
administrative act, instead of a bill. The beginning of the 90’s was also the
time that the engagement of clergy in political decisions seemed to be
most visible. In one of the pastoral letters from 1990, written by bishop
Józef Michalik such words can be found: “It should not be said, that an at-
titude of the religious indifference, agnosticism or atheism, does not influ-
ence the decision for whom to vote. Only the people having strong
conscience are able to serve their community in a proper way”22. Two
years later, cardinal Józef Glemp, in those days the primate of Poland,
pointed out that: “We want to serve the nation as we have done before and
no one is allowed to teach us how to do that. We understand the nation and
we want to serve it in a way that we find the best”23.
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The genesis of the “cold war” between the Catholic church hierarchy
and the laic intelligentsia is strongly connected with the reluctance of the
former to the model of the privatization of the religious beliefs24. How-
ever, it should be also emphasized that the latter used to judge the public
engagement of the church using opportunistic criteria. When the hierarchy
has supported the liberal values it’s voice was very positively valuated
by the former laic left, but each time when the statements were critical
to liberalism, the Church was accused of being too much involved into
politics25.
The process of the secularization of the sacred in the Polish political
discourse, manifest itself in the huge probability, that a model of religious-
ness that belong to the individual, will also affect the political affiliation
and even cultural preferences. It seems to be justified to distinguish three
major orientations, which are expressed both by the clergy and lay follow-
ers. The proposed typology is a widen version of the one created previ-
ously by Jaros³aw Gowin26.
a) The “open” Catholicism
– inspired by teaching of The Second Vatican Council, as well as the phi-
losophy of personalism;
– open to an interdenominational and cross- religion dialogue;
– emphasize of the value of individual responsibility and freedom as the
elements of the doctrine;
– critical attitude to the ritual dimension of religion and emphasizing the
links between the religious and national identity;
– critical approach to Polish history (also the church history) and cultural
heritage;
– affirmation of the evolutionary character of political transition after
1989;
– support of integration with the European Union;
– political affiliation can be called moderately liberal, in some cases it is
social liberalism, preference to the parliamentary political system;
– moderately critical approach to the moral rigorism of the church hierar-
chy (especially in the area of “the politics of life” and sexual ethic).
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b) The “integral” Catholicism
– balance between opening to the challenges of modernity and criticism
of axiological relativism, it’s aim can be called “modernization in the
name of traditional values”;
– democracy is accepted mostly at it’s procedural dimension, while the
philosophical fundaments (e.g. the religious neutrality of the state) are
being criticized;
– moderate support for Poland joining EU, described as “euro-realism”;
reluctance for any engagement of the EU institutions at the “sphere of
values”, it’s activity should be limited to the economic cooperation; the
idea of “Europe of the Homelands”;
– connections with the heritage of the democratic opposition groups ac-
ting before 1989 that has not defined themselves as “the laic left”,
strong anticommunism;
– the evolutionary character of political transition is being generally ac-
cepted, but not affirmated;
– the need of strong executive government and the concept of political ra-
tionality (in contrast with the “closed” Catholicism) is emphasized;
– much attention is put to the media communication.
c) The “closed” Catholicism
– the manicheic vision of social reality and fatalistic approach to history;
– any form of liberalism is considered to be a disguised form of totalita-
rianism;
– the past is very much valuated, although it is treated in an ahistorical
way; religion has very close ties with the national identity, the universal
dimension of the further is not very important;
– the fundament of religiousness is not the conscious reflection, but the
devotion of the followers;
– the modern world is considered to be a seat of danger, and is treated both
with fear and aggression;
– especially the representatives of the symbolic elites and the supporters of
the “open Catholicism” used to be seen as enemies – the “hidden commu-
nist” or “Polish speaking citizens, not Poles”, there are some of them even
inside the Church hierarchy and they are known by name (the former sena-
tor has accused one of the bishops considered to be friendly to dialogue
with non–believers of a “postmodernist indoctrination”, not rarely the ele-
ments of conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic attitudes can be observe;
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– reluctance both to capitalism and the European Union, they are conside-
red to be “anti-Christian”. The alternative to them are: the idea of “eco-
nomic independence” and “pan-Slavic cooperation”;
– the need of charismatic leadership is widely expressed; and the law sys-
tem should strictly reflect the Christian axiology;
– the approach to the communist system is complex, although it is verbal-
ly neglected in a very strong way, the social policy is valuated, what is
more many prominent supporters of the “closed Catholicism” used to be
the members of the Christian organizations that cooperated with the
communist government.
It should be noted that the symbolic elites of the “integral Catholicism”
very often show their reluctance to the public statements of “the closed
Catholics” although when the discussed issue focused on ethic issues (e.g.
abortion law) or the controversial issues in the national history (e.g. the
massacre of Jewish citizens in Jedwabne village, during the Second World
War) it is not easy to distinguish the statements of these two parts of the
public opinion27. The similar alliance could be observed when “the closed
Catholics” were very radically criticised by the vast majority of the public
opinion (e.g. in case of the conflict upon the presence of the cross symbol
at the area of the former Nazi concentration camp in Auschwitz)28.
While the Polish political discourse is being analised, also an impor-
tant element of secularization of the sacred can be observed. The political
opponents are treated as the religious enemies or even the metaphysical in-
carnation of evil. As a consequence, no boundaries between the secular
and the holy are needed. To quote the former MP Jan £opuszañski “We
want Poland to recognise Christ as it’s King. This is the duty not only of
the Holy Church but also the state government and the whole society”.
Many right wing parties as well as the “Solidarity” trade union, were de-
nying the law of establishing the new state constitution by the democrati-
cally elected parliament. The reason for such a statement was that the
parliamentary majority belonged to the left-wing party, which has trans-
formed from the communist one eight years before. The approach of the
clergy to the problem of directly mentioning the God’s name in the consti-
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tution preamble was changing into the one represented by the “closed Ca-
tholicism”. In 1993 the joint commission of the Episcopate and the
minority denominations representatives pointed out that the constitutional
regulations will be obligatory to all the citizens instead of their religious
identity and. As a consequence mentioning God’s name in the constitu-
tional preamble can divide society. Three years later the Episcopate sup-
ported not only the Invocatio Dei (the preamble with God’s name) but also
the idea of the superiority of the natural law behind the state one and de-
fined the source of the government as “the Polish nation” instead of “the
state citizens”29.
The process of sacralisation of profane can be observed even without
any engagement of the ecclesial hierarchy at the political scene. Many
statements of Law and Justice Party can be described as the examples of
the previously mentioned process. Even the name of the party is associ-
ated with religious beliefs. “He loves law and justice, He punishes the bad
people” – this is a quote from the Biblical Book of David. The discourse
created by the prominent members of Law and Justice and it’s supporters
from the circle of the symbolic elites connected with this party presents the
Polish reality in an apocalyptical way30. In 2003 Jaros³aw Kaczyñski, the
party chairman said: “The present form of our state could not and can not
play a positive role in a process of nation building. Instead it petrifies the
status quo, in which weakness and constant parceling out the state struc-
tures are the guarantees of it’s stability. This system in an excellent way
unites the lack of justice with lack of any ideals, what also means serious
limitation of altruistic motivation in social life. The power of this system is
huge. The disintegration affects the whole nation, as well as smaller com-
munities, it is omnipotent”31. The demanded shape of the future is de-
scribed as the form of the Final Judgment. The division of political scene
is considered to be grounded upon very strong historical fundaments that
implies using the binary oppositions.
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It should be emphasised that the boundaries between the religious and
secular sphere in the Polish political discourse still used to be fluent. Nev-
ertheless since the beginning of the present century a process of their stabi-
lization can be observed. The historic circumstances has been conductive
both to the process of the secularization of the sacred (the example of
which was playing the non-religious social roles by the Catholic clergy),
and sacralization of the profane, (that was manifested in the tendency to
treat the political opponent as religious enemy).
Contrary to the widely known thesis, the change of the perception of
the social activity of the dominant Church by the vast majority of Poles
does not seem to have a revolutionary character. It should be taken into
consideration that the Polish religiosity is to large extend the strong factor
of social identity while not being the source of individual spiritual experi-
ences. This fact can be illustrated by the researches of theological aware-
ness, for example according to Piwowarski, only the 49% of respondents
living in cities believe in the existence of hell, while 93% of them accept
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception32. Before 1989, the clergy did
not require much from the people from their lay supporters in the cam-
paign for democratization of a public sphere, as far as theological con-
sciousness or even private morality were concerned33.
It is justified to make a statement that the attitudes toward the church
were to large extend determined by the tendencies to the social orientation
which was called by Reykowski a hierarchical collectivism34. In such ori-
entation, the people possessing the lower social position are responsible
for their acts before people that have higher one, while the latter are re-
sponsible for the condition of the former. While the communist govern-
ment did not have the strong social legitimisation, the church may be
considered by people that manifest just mentioned orientation as the
quasi-government before which they were responsible. After the demo-
cratic transformation, the individual costs of socially sanctioned affilia-
tion with the Catholic church became much higher, what have to caused
mass objection. The lack of understanding of the clear church statements
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in many important social issues, as well as many serious mistakes made
by the clergy during expressing such attitudes, are determined by the fact
that the dichotomy between public and private sphere is perceiving as an
absolute.
The sphere called by Offe “a non-institutional politics sphere” is not
clearly defined in a mass consciousness35. In the countries with high de-
gree of political culture, the mentioned sphere is the domain of new social
movements that mostly have left–wing roots. In the Polish reality, when
the social democratic, former communist, party has for many years after
1989 played the role of a conservative party in the political system36.
Moreover, it has to a large extend represent the interests of the incumbents
of economic transformation, the political contestation has the radical
right-wing character and is often connected with “closed Catholicism”37.
As it has been shown in this article, the boundaries between religious
and non-religious contents of Polish public discourse seem to be very
liquid. Also, it is not easy to distinguish the two processes defined in the
theoretical part of this work. Although nowadays the influence of the insti-
tutional Catholic church is much weaker than it was during the nineties, it
has been replaced by the activity of the politically engaged laic followers.
It should be emphasized that the new fields of conflict between religious
and secular spheres were opened during the last months, e.g. the issue of
the artificial conception (in vitro procedure). The line of division, as far as
the approach to this issue is concerned, goes across the political parties
and their parliamentary cocuses. After the catastrophe of the presidential
plane at 10th April 2010, with many prominent members of political elites
on board it became obvious how liquid the mentioned boundaries are.
Many examples of secularization of sacrum sphere as well as the opposite
process in the political discourse after this tragedy can be seen. On the one
hand, many representatives of the Catholic clergy consider the interpreta-
tion of this event in terms of religious symbols (the fatal accident hap-
pened one day before the Sunday of God’s Mercy, during the time of
Easter’s octave and one week after the fifth anniversary of the death of
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John Paul II) as well as in context of national martyrdom (Poland as
“Christ of nations”). On the other, politicians tend to treat the mentioned
tragedy as the fundament of their own philosophy of history which is used
as a tool of political marketing during the presidential campaign.
The very important factor of today’s (June 2010) reality is the polariza-
tion of the previously mentioned models of religiosity strongly connected
with political affiliations. The interpretations of the catastrophe itself and
it’s political consequence given by the supporters of “open Catholicism”
are very close to the analysis given by the commentators which are distant
or even reluctant to the Church institution. The authors of “Tygodnik
Powszechny” express their hopes for the national reconciliation38 but also
their concern connected with the monopolization of the national mourning
by the politicians of Law and Justice39 as well as the disturbance of consti-
tutional boundaries between church and state during the funeral ceremony
of Lech Kaczyñski40. Meanwhile, the boundaries between the “closed Ca-
tholicism” and the “integral” one became almost impossible to recognize,
as in every critical moment. The only visible difference between them is
that the former is concentrated on proving the Russian conspiracy41 while
the supporters of the latter interpret the tragic accident as the Providence’s
memento for Poland which is getting more and more laicized but also
the chance to build the new meta-political “republican community”42.
It seems that the influence that the totally unpredictable tragedy near
Smoleñsk does have on Polish political scene, does strengthen our thesis
formulated in December 2008, although it is almost impossible to predict
how the boundaries between religious and secular will look after the presi-
dential elections.
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Streszczenie
Prezentowany tekst stanowi zmodyfikowan¹ wersjê wyst¹pienia wyg³oszonego
podczas miêdzynarodowej konferencji “Religion, identity and life courses”, zorgani-
zowanej przez Institute for the Studies of Religion in Central and Eastern Europe
(ISORECA). Sympozjum odby³o siê w grudniu 2008 w Collegium Medicum Uniwer-
sytetu Jagielloñskiego. Artyku³ poœwiêcony jest specyfice relacji miêdzy porz¹dkiem
sakralnym a œwieckim w polskim systemie politycznym. Problematyka ujêta zosta³a
w kontekœcie reprezentowanych w literaturze przedmiotu paradygmatów publicznego
funkcjonowania religijnoœci oraz uwarunkowañ maj¹cych swe Ÿród³o w specyfice pol-
skiej kultury politycznej. Wyodrêbniono paralelne procesy sekularyzacji sacrum i sa-
kralizacji profanum oraz typy afiliacji politycznej skorelowane z modelami polskiej
religijnoœci. Jak siê wydaje, zaproponowane modele i konkluzje zachowuj¹, a nawet
wzmacniaj¹ sw¹ aktualnoœæ w perspektywie politycznych reperkusji katastrofy lotni-
czej pod Smoleñskiem, a wiêc wydarzenia nieprzewidywalnego w ramach progno-
stycznej funkcji nauk politycznych.
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